Flagship case ยท AI Product Risk & Safety

Redis P0 Before First Users

A pre-launch safety audit found a P0 token exposure in Redis before the product had its first users.

Disclosure

This is my own product. The case covers product-safety engineering; it makes no claim about clinical outcomes, certification, or client consulting work.

One-sentence outcome

Before first users, the safety audit found and removed a P0 Redis token exposure that would have turned read access to Redis into read access to active user conversations.

Context and stakes

The product handled highly sensitive therapy-style conversations, so a security flaw was not a generic backend nuisance; it would have crossed directly into user trust and public-safety risk.

Baseline and constraints

Row Level Security still worked correctly, which made the flaw harder to notice at a glance. The vulnerable move was ordinary engineering plumbing: storing Supabase bearer tokens next to long-lived session state for convenience.

Exact role

Founding AI Product Architect and owner of the product, responsible for the pre-launch audit, exploit reproduction, remediation design, and the deterministic gate that prevented the issue from returning.

Trigger to measured change

  1. Trigger

    A planned pre-launch security pass treated Redis contents as first-class evidence instead of assuming integration tests represented safety.

  2. Constraint

    The product needed reconnect-friendly long sessions without turning persistence convenience into credential persistence.

  3. Decision

    Reproduce the exploit, remove plaintext bearer tokens from Redis, keep them only in request or websocket memory, and add a deterministic Redis scan gate to CI.

  4. Measured change

    The observed result was a reproduced P0 finding, a concrete remediation, and a build-time check that now fails if token-shaped data returns to Redis.

Before first users, a Redis exposure of plaintext Supabase bearer tokens was reproduced and remediated with a deterministic scan.

This is self-owned product safety evidence only. Please do not imply clinical efficacy, certification, regulated approval, or client consulting proof from this record.

Context
NearbyTo.me product safety audit with sensitive user-conversation data at stake.
Timeframe
Pre-launch security pass recorded in the phase-0 ledger on 2026-09-02.
Baseline
Exploit path: read access to Redis could yield still-valid bearer tokens for active chats.
Role
Founding AI Product Architect and owner of the product, responsible for the pre-launch audit, exploit reproduction, remediation design, and the deterministic gate that prevented the issue from returning.
Source
Review the source record
Provenance
Source post, long-form product article, and master profile.
Confidence
A - first-party reproduction and remediation mechanics are explicit.
Disclosure
Named, self-owned product; no client attribution is implied.

Measured or observable result

Before first users, a Redis exposure of plaintext Supabase bearer tokens was reproduced and remediated with a deterministic scan. The build gate now fails if Redis holds token-shaped authentication material.

Attribution and caveat

This is self-owned product safety evidence only. Please do not imply clinical efficacy, certification, regulated approval, or client consulting proof from this record.

Retained capability

The retained capability is a cleaner session boundary: Redis keeps identifiers, timestamps, and counters, while live auth stays ephemeral and therefore easier to reason about.

Related problem, next case, and CTA

The related case stays in the same problem domain and shifts from product safety to fraud-farm economics without inventing a measured outcome.